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Introduction© 
Among the priceless things in life, the most promi-
nent one has to be life itself. Not only people are 
generally unable to name a value for their own lives 
or the life of somebody else, but they are also re-
pulsed with the very idea, feeling that the task is too 
morbid or awesome to consider. The consensus 
seems to be that death, being the end of everything, 
is an event that virtually nobody (some special cases 
excluded) would consciously consent to, no matter 
how much they would possibly be paid for it.  
Considering life as priceless generates an anomaly 
for neoclassical economics: use of expected utility 
theory implies that rational individuals would never 
engage in an action that would increase, even mar-
ginally, their probability of dying; for if the utility 
from death is taken to be infinitely negative (a con-
sequence of life being assumed as priceless), any 
lottery that would incorporate a risk of death with 
no matter how small a probability would be valued 
at  too. Thus, any other lottery that would not in-
clude such an outcome would be preferrable. This 
would mean, for example, that individuals would 
never accept even slightly risky jobs no matter the 
wage offered, or that they would never rationally 
choose to smoke a cigarette, drink alcohol, have a 
meal in a fast-food restaurant or ride the roller 
coaster in the local amusement park. Because the 
multitude of people who actually do these things 
cannot all be irrational, it seems that the risk of 
death does carry a price, no matter how technically 
hard it may be to determine. 
The reason why it is interesting to assign some real 
number to that price is that, in economics, the value 
of life is an essential element for conducting cost-
benefit analyses on policies and regulations relevant 
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to health and safety. For prevention of accidental 
deaths or a decrease in fatal risks encountered in 
some specific context may imply vast expenditures, 
knowledge of the value of life is decisive on whether 
these expenditures should be undertaken or not. 
Since, however, considering life as a commodity 
proper violates moral rules inherent in humans, 
economists stress that such calculation is acceptable 
only ex ante, when the fatal risk targets nobody in 
particular, but remains a statistical figure. This 
means that valuation of life does not refer to identi-
fied lives, but to “statistical lives” – to anonymous 
persons whose lives may or may not be at stake, and 
who cannot be known to be at risk beforehand, not 
until they are actually affected by that risk, if it so 
happens. 
The aim of this paper is to offer a discussion on the 
valuation of statistical life in economics. Although, 
it is mainly a review paper, its contribution is not 
restricted to surveying the relevant literature; pri-
marily, its contribution lies in the critical and com-
parative presentation of the main methods used for 
measuring the value of a statistical life (VSL here-
after), as well as in the offering of a discussion on 
the implications of these method’s limitations. As 
it is argued in the next Sections, some of these 
limitations are linked to deeper problems within 
economic theory, and more specifically, to the 
axiomatic definition of the rational individual as a 
utility-maximizing agent. 
The shortcomings of the methods used to measure 
VSL have been discussed in several papers in the 
literature. Among the most recent ones, Ashenfelter 
(2006) and Viscusi (2008) place the focus on trade-
offs between money and fatal safety risks, Guria et 
al. (2005) explore inconsistencies in individuals’ 
stated preferences, and Becker (2007) offers an in-
sightful discussion on health as human capital. Our 
approach is more general and theoretical, to encom-
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pass all prominent methods, and to provide a link 
between the methods’ shortcomings and those of 
rational choice theory.  
The methodology used in this paper focuses on the 
theoretical issues of the most common methods for 
evaluating a statistical life, and not too much on 
their technical aspects. Before this presentation, we 
offer a discussion on the distinction between actual 
and statistical lives (Section 1), in order to clarify 
what these methods attempt to measure and to jux-
tapose with what they actually measure. Section 2 
continues with the comparative analysis of the main 
VSL methods. We distinguish between two classes 
of methods: the human capital approach (Section 
2.1) and the willingness to pay approach (Section 
2.2). The latter is further distinguished into two 
categories: hedonic valuations (Section 2.2.1) and 
contingent studies (Section 2.2.2). Finally, Section 3 
concludes with a discussion on the emerging practi-
cal, philosophical and ethical problems, and sug-
gests that, because cost-benefit analysis using VSL 
present limited validity, their use in policy making 
with regards to safety and health should not be con-
clusive, but rather, complementary to exogenous 
and ad hoc considerations.  
1. Life through statistics 
There are two ways in which a statistical life can be 
understood (Heinzerling, 2000). Firstly, a statistical 
life is a real (but unidentified) life expected to be 
lost (or saved) as a function of probabilities of 
death, applied to a population of persons, and after 
the assessment of risk data available. A simple ex-
ample would be an expectation, based on past data, 
that in the next x years, there will be y fatalities due 
to train accidents. Naturally, a prediction like this 
may or may not come to be confirmed, and this is 
why these lives are referred to as “statistical” (as 
opposed to “actual”). Another interpretation is that 
a statistical life is an aggregation of fatal risks that 
threaten individuals in a population; for example, 
an estimated fatality risk of 1/100 in a population 
of 1,000 means the loss of ten statistical lives, and 
decreasing this risk to 1/1,000 means that nine 
statistical lives shall be saved. In this regard, “sta-
tistical life” is a measure of collective risk affecting 
a population.  
A statistical life is understandably very different 
from an actual life, in both theory and practice; the 
statistical life is an abstract concept, much closer to 
a probability of some risk than the life of a real per-
son, and as such, it cannot prompt feelings of moral 
duty, awe, or sympathy, at least not to the degree an 
identified life can. For a telling example, one could 
think of the difference between earthquake victims 
trapped alive under ruins and individuals, whose 
houses put them at fatal risk if an earthquake occurs. 
People would generally be more willing to provide 
help to the former than to the latter, since the former 
are identified as actual victims, while the latter are 
potential, “statistical” victims. It is as if the uncer-
tainty regarding the statistical life somehow re-
moves some weight off it, making it less valuable 
than a life proper.  
Except for uncertainty, another feature of the statis-
tical life that allegedly makes it less valuable than 
an actual life is the issue of unidentifiability. It 
seems that an identified victim generates stronger 
reactions of altruism and care than an anonymous 
one, which can be explained on the grounds that 
people generally feel more connected when they 
know who is the victim. Indeed, there are numerous 
researchers to support this conjecture, for example, 
Charness and Gneezy (2000) and Small and Loewen-
stein (2003). In both studies, subjects in a laboratory 
experiment playing the dictator game were more 
generous when they had some information on their 
co-players than when they had none at all. The writ-
ers conclude that determined victims possibly pro-
vide more salient reasons to act, for identifiability 
diminishes psychological and social distance. The 
less the social distance, to more one is made willing 
to help, which means that the “more identified” the 
victim is (that is, the more information available on 
them), the more the public is expected to want to 
help them.  
Nevertheless, in a subsequent article, Small and 
Loewenstein (2005) show that identifiability can 
have other effects too (like, creating a tendency for 
punitiveness), depending on the available informa-
tion on the target to what extent people will be af-
fected by someone, being a victim, is contingent on 
the characteristics of the victim themselves. This 
last point is best illustrated by Heinzerling (2000) 
who gives the example of people generally being 
indifferent towards a homeless person they see in 
the streets, even if “it is hard to imagine a more 
clearly identified person in need”. The conclusion is 
that identifiability of a victim plays a role in altering 
people’s reactions towards them, even if this may 
not always be for the better. How one’s perception 
and psychological response shall be formulated 
seems to depend on the traits the identification shall 
bring forward. For a simple but illustrative example, 
people may be more willing to help a young or 
good-looking person than an older or less good-
looking one, even when the victims are identified to 
equal degrees.  
This ambiguity with regards to how people react 
towards identified and unidentified victims implies 
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an uncertainty as to whether an identified life is 
always valued more than an unidentified one. And 
even if it could be proved that a statistical life is 
always less significant (as evaluated by people 
themselves) than an actual life, this should not nec-
essarily mean that the latter is priceless, while the 
former is not. It appears that the difference between 
an actual and a statistical life which enables econo-
mists to proclaim the former as priceless and to 
monetise the latter is not an empirical or theoretical 
fact, but rather, a theoretical decision that serves a 
moral code, saying that it is unacceptable to treat 
actual lives as commodities, but it is adequate to 
attach a price to statistical lives.  
Although such theoretical decision makes sense, it 
remains arbitrary, in the same way that economics 
arbitrarily bans interpersonal utility comparisons: it 
has been argued (Varoufakis, 1998) that not allow-
ing for interpersonally utility comparisons relieves 
economics of many moral dilemmas and leads to-
wards a “neutral” economic theory. Similarly, axio-
matically disallowing the monetisation of an identi-
fied life excludes unpleasant implications of the sort 
that an economic agent would be entitled to take 
somebody else’s life if they paid the corresponding 
price. Nevertheless, dealing with statistical lives 
only does not resolve all moral issues, if the statis-
tical life is commodified then, for example, and in 
a reasoning analogous to the above, an economic 
agent would be able to buy the right to take away 
one life at random with some positive probability.  
The main point of this discussion is that, axiomati-
cally allowing for valuation of statistical lives as a 
proxy for actual ones only partly removes the moral 
issues attached. Still, if one wants to conduct a cost-
benefit analysis relating to matters of health and 
safety, one inevitably will have to use some price, 
so, it is helpful that the distinction is made at all. If 
the whole cost-benefit analysis is justifiable in these 
regards is a different matter, and one we will briefly 
discuss in Section 3. Before that, the Section that 
follows presents how VSL is actually performed and 
what further problems may emerge because of the 
methodologies chosen.  
2. Methods for estimating the value  
of a statistical life  
In theory, VSL could be calculated by asking all 
individuals within the population to place their 
valuations, and then by computing the average, us-
ing whatever weights one would find appropriate. 
Obviously, the main problem of such an imaginary 
approach is that most individuals would simply not 
know how to respond to such a query, and the pri-
mary reason for that is that the loss of a life (even if 
it is statistical) is too complex an event to be cap-
tured in one and only number.  
Indeed, the loss of a statistical life has a variety of 
consequences, some of which are quite easy to be 
expressed in monetary terms, while some others are 
not. Schelling (1968) makes the distinction between 
one’s life and one’s livelihood, the latter referring to 
the material losses associated with death (such as 
the loss of working potential), which are generally 
possible to compute with objectivity, as being mar-
ketable. But on the other hand, there is an array of 
other implications (like grief or pain) which are hard 
to quantify and be added up to the cost of life as it 
would appear in an accountant’s book. The promi-
nent method of VSL, which is based on individuals’ 
willingness to pay for small changes in fatality risks 
that affect them, surpasses the inconvenience in a 
manner similar to how rational choice theory cir-
cumvents the issue of one-dimensional utility: it 
uses individual choices (either intended or already 
made) as revelatory for preferences. Another com-
mon method, the human capital approach, deals 
with the problem of non-marketable aspects of life 
by ignoring them completely.  
2.1. The human capital approach. The human 
capital (HC hereafter) method of valuing life is 
based on the assumption that the loss of a life only 
amounts to the loss of livelihood, that is, to the cor-
responding future production potential (Landefeld 
and Seskin, 1982). The main task comes down to 
the calculation of the present discounted value of 
expected labour earnings, although, there are nu-
merous contributions in the literature to have en-
riched the method with additional considerations, 
aiming to make the computation more accurate. For 
example, some studies deduct expected consump-
tion from expected wages, others incorporate taxa-
tion, and most of them include some value for 
housekeeping activities. The resulting figure is sup-
posed to reflect the value of a life from society’s 
perspective, being nothing more than an estimate of 
how GNP shall be altered by one fatality.  
Even if livelihood was all that mattered about life, 
the HC approach would still be unavoidably generic, 
and rather loose with regards to its results: the 
valuation, it makes, is inevitably based on a series of 
assumptions, for example, there are no “shocks” in 
consumption or changes in income, or that the dis-
count rate remains fixed throughout the years of 
calculation. Of course, it would be technically easy 
to make fuller HC models to allow for such changes, 
but this would not make sense as an ex ante proce-
dure. Generally, there would be no good reason why 
the model should, for example, incorporate a ran-
dom income shock in T years from now, or use a 
Environmental Economics, Volume 1, Issue 2, 2010 
 14
changing discount rate rather than a fixed one). For 
this reason, the HC method provides a proxy for 
the value of livelihood, but sometimes its too sim-
ple premises render its accuracy debatable. 
On the other hand, this simplicity of the HC method 
seems to be its greatest advantage: the value for 
statistical lives generated by HC estimates fails to 
cause moral objections (at least to the degree other 
methods do) because, by definition, it is a neutral 
display of accounting and simple algebra. It is, in 
fact, so neutral that it does not apply to anyone in 
particular but to the “ideal” individual, whose in-
come is given and unchanged for the rest of their 
lives, whose consumption streams are constant, who 
will retire at exactly the predicted moment and pass 
away exactly at the age given by life expectancy 
statistics, with nobody missing them when they are 
gone. That aside, another virtue of the method is the 
clarity in its concept and its uncomplicated mathe-
matics, as well as the indisputable character of its 
results – the features that the HC technique owes its 
popularity to. Starting with the same data on labour 
force participation and projected earnings, two dif-
ferent researchers will arrive at the same valuation, 
provided that they use the same discount rate.  
Choice of a discount factor is a decision of major 
importance, and one that is also crucial for the 
whole framework of cost-benefit analysis as well. 
As the results provided by the HC approach are 
functions of the discount rate to be used, it is obvi-
ous that, if there is no pre-set value for the discount 
rate upon which everyone agrees, the valuations of 
livelihood will vary within sizeable ranges along 
with the different rates of discount. This observation 
strongly challenges the objective character of the 
method, especially if one considers that some re-
searcher favouring a specific outcome might be able 
to choose the rate that shall so produce it. To over-
come the problem, researchers usually perform sen-
sitivity analyses (Berk et al., 1978). Arrow et al. 
(1996) suggest the use of a variety of discount rates, 
ideally to be the same across different analyses, also 
stressing the need for external reviews of the corre-
sponding conclusions.  
Another discrepancy of the HC technique relates to 
the fact that the input it requires violates, to a de-
gree, the notion of a statistical life: the unknown and 
unidentified targets are not completely anonymous, 
for there is a substantial amount of information ac-
quired about them – their age, their income or their 
consumption. Along with this point, the HC ap-
proach has several unpleasant implications; for ex-
ample, if computed for a retired person, the value of 
life is found to be negative (and as such, the strict 
cost-benefit analysis would instruct society to dis-
pose of the said individual). Also, someone with a 
higher wage would be valued more than someone 
with a lower wage (ceteris paribus), which is an 
unsettling implication, not only from a moral point 
of view, but also because this seems to violate in-
comparability of interpersonal utilities. To its de-
fense, HC was never meant to be egalitarian or ap-
peal to moral sentiment: all, it calculates, is the ma-
terial costs of someone dying and nothing else. 
Thus, if the value of a life of a businessman turns 
out to be greater than that of a worker, that is only 
because the death of the former affects GNP more. 
Up to this point, the logic is well understood, and 
perfectly reasonable; however, to use these values 
for deciding on health regulation requires a great 
logical leap that remains unjustified and unac-
counted for.  
It appears that, while the HC approach results in an 
objective and irrefutable valuation on some com-
ponents of life, it is largely inadequate as a number 
to reflect the value of a statistical life, for it ignores 
other components that are too important (both 
practically and theoretically) to just forgo. Adopt-
ing the HC methodology means that life is not but 
a stream of assets – a view that clearly diminishes 
the nature of life, as conceived by individuals. 
Notwithstanding its usefulness in assessing the 
material side of life, the HC method remains ir-
relevant to give a credible indication of what the 
value of life really is and what it really means for 
society – and not just for its accounting books. For 
these reasons, even if it might still be used in cer-
tain contexts (for example, by insurance compa-
nies), the technique is considered to be outdated, 
having being replaced by the alternatives presented 
in the next subsection.  
2.2. Willingness to pay. Rather than trying to theo-
retically assess the statistical life with a computa-
tional method, if the task is to capture how life is 
truly valued by individuals, it makes sense to try and 
extract that number from them directly. The will-
ingness to pay method (WTP) is an attempt to per-
form VSL based on individual preferences with 
regards to the money they would be willing to spend 
or that they have already spent for a specific de-
crease in some risk. There are two different classes 
of methodologies: hedonic studies use data already 
available from existing markets; the underlying 
preferences are supposed to reveal risk-money 
trade-offs implicitly (or explicitly) made by eco-
nomic agents. In contingent valuation studies, indi-
viduals are asked to place ex ante valuations (for 
example, by use of questionnaires), after consider-
ing imaginary scenarios of risk-money trade-offs. 
These two approaches are often referred to as re-
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vealed preference (RP) and stated preference (SP) 
methods, respectively.  
2.2.1. Hedonic valuation. The hedonic approach 
uses existing markets as proxies for the value of 
fatality risks. Commonly, researchers use data from 
the labour market (a description of the methodol-
ogy and a detailed review of empirical data from 
various such studies appears in Viscusi and Aldy, 
2003). There are also numerous studies that use data 
from commodity markets, involving risk-money or 
risk-time trade-offs. For example, Ashenfelter and 
Greenstone (2004) consider individual choices 
about road safety by investigating the speed with 
which agents choose to drive on highways vs. the 
corresponding risk that their choices entail. Drey-
fus and Viscusi (1995) examine road safety too, by 
regressing car purchase prices on the safety they 
provide, while Jenkins et al. (2001) examine the 
purchase of bicycle helmets. To construct a he-
donic model, consideration of any marketable prod-
uct or service that entails some – however small – 
fatal risk is apt for the analysis, like the market for 
cigarettes (Ippolito and Ippolito, 1984) or the mar-
ket for houses near hazardous waste site areas 
(Gayer et al., 2000).  
The rationale of the approach is straightforward: 
any market-based choice made by an individual 
reveals an implicit or explicit preference of risk 
that can be quantified. A worker accepting a job 
with some risk p that offers wage W is assumed to 
be compensated for undertaking that risk, otherwise 
they would demand a higher wage or look for a 
safer job. Consumers buying cars are not just buying 
means of transportation but a whole bundle of 
goods, some of which are related to safety. If some 
of the car’s components did not interest the con-
sumer, they would opt for a cheaper car and, there-
fore, the fact that, for example, consumer i chose a 
car with an airbag at cost c rather than a car with no 
airbag that would cost c´< c means that, ceteris pari-
bus, the consumer values the reduction of risk of-
fered by the airbag at c – c´ or more. In some other 
cases, the calculation is even simpler when risk 
preferences are revealed directly, for instance, by 
actions like the purchase of additional cigarette fil-
ters, smoke detectors or private security services.  
It is not surprising that this approach is subject to all 
the criticisms that may apply to neoclassical eco-
nomics and rational choice theory. To rely on mar-
ket choices in order to compute the cost of some 
fatal risk presupposes confidence in that individual 
preferences are consistent, and more radically, that 
rational individuals act on the sole purpose of 
maximising what is on the top of their preference 
lists, subject to their budget constraints (a theoreti-
cal view on rationality often referred to as ‘act 
utilitarianism’).  
Both these premises are often believed to be inade-
quate for describing individual behavior (for exam-
ple, Sugden, 1991). Act utilitarianism gets often 
contrasted with “rule utilitarianism” (for a detailed 
comparison, see Harsanyi, 1985), which provides an 
alternative explanation for human behavior that does 
not always agree with the neoclassical view. For 
example, someone accepting a hazardous job as a 
fireman1 may not consider at all the risk encoun-
tered with regards to the wage offered (they may 
even find the job downright ineffective in strictly 
monetary terms), but still think of the occupation as 
worthwhile because of its social and moral tenure. 
The consistency of preferences has also been ques-
tioned: the Allais and the Ellsberg paradoxes (Al-
lais, 1953; Ellsberg, 1961) are standard (counter) 
examples; more recently, the behavioralists’ school 
of thought have effectively argued that individuals 
are not really consistent in the market choices they 
make. For example, in the context of VSL, an indi-
vidual’s preference over wearing their seatbelt may 
imply a certain value for risk, but the wage this very 
individual accepts for their job may imply a differ-
ent value for it. In this regard, the phenomenon of 
smoking is in itself a paradox (Schelling, 1978), if 
people actually spend money to increase a fatal risk 
rather than decrease it.  
Criticisms related to rational choice theory are not 
the only reasons why hedonic methods may fail to 
determine an objective value for statistical life. An-
other issue of critical importance is whether indi-
viduals have perfect information or not. To accu-
rately be able to calculate someone’s valuation of 
risk from one’s market choices, it is implied that the 
exact risk to be encountered is acknowledged and 
taken into consideration. But more often than not, 
this assumption fails to apply: people typically do 
not know exactly in how much danger they are if 
they do not wear their seatbelts, they might deliber-
ately forget the increase in risk when lighting up 
another cigarette or may be in ignorance of the full 
dangers that can happen on the job. Thus, what is 
truly revealed by this method is the valuation of risk 
as subjectively perceived by the individual, if, of 
course, considered at all. 
This does not mean that risk data are unavailable per 
se. Of course, in many instances, economic agents 
can plausibly be believed to remain unaware of the 
risks they encounter (for example, workers typically 
do not know exactly how many fire distinguishers 
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are installed in the workplace), but because this 
information can generally be obtained (unless some-
one else has an incentive to hide it), the real prob-
lem is often not so much one of ignorance, but of 
correct interpretation of risk data. It is argued that, 
people are unable to understand or deal with very 
small numbers, as the changes in risks to be consid-
ered typically (Schelling, 1968), which means that 
even if individuals do their best to be consistent, 
they may show more willingness to eliminate a 
1/10,000 risk than a 5/40,000 risk, simply because 
there is a chance that they will fall short of compar-
ing the two numbers correctly. Even if these risks 
are evaluated correctly, their difference is so small 
that it might not have any particular meaning for the 
individuals making the calculation. 
Another issue pertaining to hedonic methods is that 
of their relevance: the revealed willingness to pay 
may not reflect the individuals’ true valuation for 
safety but a proxy for its lower bound. When 
someone pays an extra cost for a car with an airbag 
means that this individual values the decrease in 
risk at least what they paid for it. They might as 
well pay more, if the car was more expensive. On 
the one hand, budget constrained individuals, who 
would normally be willing to spend some amount 
of money for protection, are expected to spend less 
than they would want to, and therefore, their mar-
ket choices do not say much about these persons’ 
true valuation of safety. On the other hand, wealthy 
persons can afford to spend more for eliminating 
risk, and in some cases, they may even purchase 
extra safety as a luxury, leading again to a mislead-
ing revelation of their true preferences with regards 
to risk. These observations imply that the level of 
wealth is unavoidably an additional factor that has 
to be taken into account while conducting hedonic 
methods.  
The relevance of hedonic methods is further ques-
tioned when one considers that these methods are 
likely to circumvent the distinction between an iden-
tified and a statistical life. When the reduction in 
risk is to be privately enjoyed, then the revealed 
valuation is not so much that of a statistical life but 
of the economic agent’s own. For example, the 
value of risk implied by someone’s contribution to 
fund public security services is not comparable to 
the value implied by the same individual’s choice on 
what to spend on a car with an airbag: poor public 
security affects all members within a society, but an 
unavailable airbag affects a very much identified 
driver. Therefore, the corresponding choices do not 
reveal valuation of the same thing. The choices 
agents make usually refer to their own lives (and not 
to “statistical people”), and for this reason, the re-
vealed values should be taken as approximations for 
the value of the statistical life that the method seeks 
to compute. The same conclusion emerges if one 
acknowledges that market choices may incorporate 
interpersonal factors (Viscusi, 1993; Strand, 2003), 
which generally implies an upward bias in the re-
vealed valuations of life. For example, someone 
would be willing to pay more for additional secu-
rity on the job than on their own home, because of 
feelings of altruism towards their colleagues. This 
would mean that the valuations would appear to be 
higher than they should be, for a fraction of each 
worker’s valuation would already be reflected in 
the valuations of others.  
As hedonic methods often use data from labour 
markets, a lot of attention has been given on 
whether the estimates generated from information 
on wage contracts are accurate. Except for the rea-
sons mentioned above (like inconsistency in prefer-
ences or incomplete information), Chapter 9 of 
Anderson (1993) provides an insightful discussion 
on why the method may fail to provide a meaningful 
value for statistical life. One prominent argument is 
that the studies in question would reveal what work-
ers are willing to pay for reductions in risk, provided 
that the underlying choices were free, informed and 
autonomous. But it’s not uncommon for workers to 
choose a job they consider to “pay badly”, only 
because they have no other option. To assume that 
workers not feeling compensated enough for the 
risks they bear, can freely (or at least, easily) choose 
another job, having a more favourable risk/wage 
ratio, is an arbitrary hypothesis that fails to always 
apply. Additionally, the labour market is typically 
not perfect: if there is high demand for jobs but not 
enough supply then employers have an incentive to 
give the jobs to the less risk-averse. Thus, the dan-
ger of unemployment will make the more risk-
averse agents engage in unwanted contracts and 
accept wages well below what they would feel ap-
propriate for undertaking certain risks.  
The imperfections of the markets hedonic methods 
are trying to use for VSL, as well as the inadequa-
cies of rational choice theory challenge the reliabil-
ity of these approaches considerably. This suggests 
that the idea to deduce the value of a statistical life 
from consumer choices is probably based on too 
normative a view and, hence, a more positive ap-
proach would be more appropriate. To this end, 
contingent studies seem a lot promising, since indi-
viduals are asked to place their valuations directly, 
without markets being the intermediary.  
2.2.2. Contingent studies. The contingent valuation 
method elicits the value of a statistical life from indi-
viduals’ responses to sample surveys (questionnaires). 
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People are asked to answer questions in the vein of 
“what is the greatest amount of money you would 
pay for [some policy] that would decrease the prob-
ability of [some risk in health] by [some amount]?”, 
and their replies are used as indicative of their prefer-
ences. Such studies offer hypothetical scenarios that 
seek to emulate market-based choices, in the absence 
of a market proper. Typically and despite of its short-
comings, this method is employed quite often for 
trying to evaluate environmental goods. A compre-
hensive overview is provided in Portney (1994). His 
publication in the Fall’s (1994) issue of “Journal of 
Economic Perspectives” was originally followed by 
two more studies, conducted by Hanemann (1994) 
and Diamond and Hausman (1994) that stood at dif-
ferent sides of the fence, presenting arguments for 
and against the methodology, respectively. 
One obvious disadvantage of contingent studies is 
that what agents are stating they would do in an 
imaginary setting. It is not necessarily that this set-
ting to be true. Defenders of the method do not 
agree with this criticism, but they suggest ways of 
calibrating the results accordingly, or place more 
attention on the questionnaires’ design in such a 
way that the subjects’ responses are as near as pos-
sible to what the method is really trying to estimate.  
Calibration of the results seems, however, to elevate 
the problem to a higher level of complexity, without 
really solving it. Successful “translation” of the 
results in a contingent study to what they actually 
“should” be, implies two things: there are some 
objective results that can be contrasted and com-
pared to the ones of the contingent study upon cali-
bration; and secondly, that the same calibration fac-
tor is apt to apply for other contingent studies as 
well. The former implication creates a problem be-
cause, unless they are derived from an experiment, 
there are no such “actual” results (and if such data 
existed, there would be little need for a contingent 
survey in the first place). As a result, the latter point 
becomes redundant to consider, but even if it was 
not, there would be nothing to guarantee that some 
calibration factor that worked well for one case, 
would work equally well for another.  
The issue of the questionnaires’ design is obviously 
fundamental and much of the debate across re-
searchers is centered around that. There exist several 
guidelines meant to facilitate the making of such a 
questionnaire (some of them are presented in Port-
ney, 1994). It is acknowledged that it makes a dif-
ference how many questions are asked, if they have 
predetermined answers (i.e., multiple choice ques-
tions) or in what order they appear. The same ques-
tion may be asked in two different ways and gener-
ate two different results. This last observation is of 
particular significance when it comes to VSL: to 
illustrate with an example, the questions “how much 
would you pay for tolerating one statistical death in 
a population of 1 million” and “how much would 
you pay for decreasing the fatal risk by 1/1,000,000 
in a population of 1 million” ask exactly the same 
thing but the different phrasing is likely to have 
people respond differently for a number of reasons.  
Regardless of the questionnaire’s design, it is also 
argued that answers to such surveys are influenced 
by the “warm glow” effect (Andreoni, 1989) or, as 
Kahneman and Knetsch (1992) put it, “the purchase 
of moral satisfaction”: the higher the valuation 
placed, the more “moral satisfaction” individuals 
get, because they know that they are expressing 
support for a good cause. In line with that, and since 
the asked questions are hypothetical, the individuals 
know they will not be called to honour their valua-
tions. So, rather than expressing their own (eco-
nomic) preferences, they might use the survey to 
make moral judgements or express opinions on the 
policies under consideration. In general, economic 
preferences are, to a degree, embedded in social 
preferences (Granovetter, 1985). This means that the 
corresponding responses are unlikely to reflect true 
economic values and the sources of this bias are so 
numerous and complex that efforts at calibrating 
them seem to be too hard a task.  
Although contingent studies avoid a big part of the 
hedonic methodology’s problems (since they rely on 
no markets), the criticism towards the latter with 
regards to rational choice and perfect information 
applies here as well. The preferences are stated 
(rather than revealed) directly, does not necessarily 
make them consistent (for some examples, see Dia-
mond and Hausman, 1994). Also, as it is also true 
for hedonic studies, the underlying assumption that 
people actually understand risk and can conceive 
small changes of it is equally problematic in the 
context of contingent studies. Moreover, there is 
again the issue of asymmetric information which 
commonly confounds the survey’s conclusions.  
Either because of their inconsistencies and their 
tendency to be affected by psychological factors or 
because of their incentives to be untruthful, it may 
be contended that, in general, individuals are not 
well trained for providing reliable answers to con-
tingent surveys (neither, of course, is it a solution to 
perform such studies only with selected, experi-
enced subjects). This conclusion is all the more true 
when the public good is relevant to safety and 
health. Individuals tend to be overly sensitive with 
regards to a fatal risk. As a result, they are likely to 
deviate considerably from the rational profile, they 
are assumed to conform to, and this is bound to in-
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validate the results of any such survey. Because of 
the additional sentimental weight attached to life and 
death, it seems that if contingent studies are some-
times criticised as inadequate for valuing an envi-
ronmental good, they are even more problematic if 
the valued good is a (statistical) life.  
Discussion and conclusion 
All three methodologies discussed above present 
shortcomings. Researchers typically tend to react 
differently as to how serious these inadequacies are. 
There, however, seems to be unanimous agreement 
that the human capital approach is not appropriate 
for VSL, on the grounds that it ignores everything 
there is about life but its material dimension. HC 
might be a useful tool for insurance companies, but 
it is not particularly helpful for policy making with 
regards to safety and health. Instead, it appears that 
some version of the WTP methodology has to be 
adopted1. 
It was previously claimed that, because explicit 
valuation of life entails indeterminate psychological 
and emotional reactions, contingent studies do not 
seem likely to produce accurate results, regardless 
of their possible success in other instances of envi-
ronmental policy. Stated preference studies of VSL 
may have greater flexibility than hedonic techniques 
but, in general, their conclusions are bound to be 
less reliable. Thus, among two classes of the will-
ingness to pay methodology, discussed in the previ-
ous Section, hedonic studies seem to be most apt for 
generating accurate results. This doesn’t mean that 
their own theoretical problems are not important, 
but the fact that they seek to explain implicit market 
choices make them more objective, albeit only mar-
ginally in some cases.  
Unsurprisingly, empirical results vary a lot across 
researchers. Viscusi and Aldy (2003) provide a re-
view of the literature and estimate the median value 
of prime-aged workers (across studies that use the 
hedonic methodology for labour markets) to be 
around $7 million in U.S., with most studies under 
consideration ranging between $3.8 million to $9 
million U.S. These values are almost the same (if 
not a little lower) if evidence from housing and 
product markets is used. They also find the results to 
be affected by the level of income, union affiliation 
and age. The PESETA project (Watkiss et al., 
2009), which aims at quantifying the effect of cli-
mate change on health in Europe, uses a value of 
statistical life equal to €1.11 million.  
                                                     
1 This does not mean the HC approach is abandoned (Landefeld and Seskin, 
1982). However, more recent studies generally tend to consider it as obsolete. 
The previous Sections provided several reasons for 
possibly staying opposed to the rationale of VSL. 
The basic assumption that there always exists a fi-
nite sum that compensates somebody for taking a 
higher risk is axiomatic, and it could be rejected just 
as axiomatically. The distinction between statistical 
and actual lives is founded on the assumption that 
statistical lives can be valued while actual lives can-
not but, as was argued in Section 1, there is evi-
dence to also support the contrary. Moreover, this 
differential is somehow blurred in the minds of 
agents who try to make risk-money trade-offs: we 
cannot know if someone who is willing to pay a 
certain amount for better road safety does it for 
eliminating their own risk when driving or for the 
sake of unidentified drivers. Section 2 presented 
numerous reasons why the methods being used for 
VSL may generate inaccurate or irrelevant results. 
With these shortcoming acknowledged, the interest-
ing question is if policy making should still use VSL 
to perform cost-benefit analysis when deciding upon 
health issues.  
An alternative could, of course, be not to perform 
cost-benefit analysis at all. However, the resources 
being scarce, it is not possible to grant all potential 
projects for eliminating health risks. On the other 
hand, abandoning all such projects is, understanda-
bly, even more repugnant than pondering on which 
cost to draw the line (Usher, 1985). To abandon any 
project decreasing fatal risks on the grounds that 
such risks cannot be valued is akin to considering 
that they have a value of zero and, as such, no pro-
ject is ever worth the expense. Nevertheless, this 
observation does not legitimise use of cost-benefit 
analysis at blind. Even if economists decide to give 
up the search to discover a value for human life (as 
proposed by Mishan, 1985), some (however arbi-
trary) proxy shall have to be adopted for it, explic-
itly or not, if any improvements in safety are going 
to be made at all.  
Of course, the straightforwardness of the cost-benefit 
analysis methodology cannot be denied. The real 
issue is not if it works, but if it should be considered 
as a panacea. One would be hard-pressed to think of 
good reasons why not to conduct a cost-benefit analy-
sis that would involve, for example, replacing all 
computers in a firm with newer models. But when it 
comes to public goods, the methodology’s limita-
tions become clear. The absence of real markets, the 
necessary (and rather ugly) monetisation of things 
nobody would normally consider to place a value on 
or the confounding factors amount to too much un-
certainty and ambiguousness for cost-benefit analy-
sis to still remain a consistent and unfailing tool. It 
may continue to give useful information as to effi-
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ciency but without additional criteria (that should be 
allowed to vary according to the problem encoun-
tered each time), the method appears to be insuffi-
cient for conducting environmental policy. Even if 
the efficiency test is passed, there are other (ethical or 
otherwise) tests to pass and this seems hard to be 
accomplished, when the theorist does not allow for 
exogenous amendments such as procedural, behav-
ioral or moral considerations.  
This is all the more true when the environmental 
good to be evaluated is health and life itself (even 
if statistical). The emotional components of these 
“goods” are too complex to afford a standard calcu- 
lation based on benefits and costs to guide the corre-
sponding actions. Undeniably, there are cases, 
where tragic choices shall have to be made and, 
where some value for life will unavoidably be im-
plied. But, following the discussion offered in this 
and the previous sections, it appears that it would be 
more appropriate to restrict the cost-benefit ap-
proach to being an advisory side-tool and then, en-
counter each problem within the frame of its unique-
ness, avoiding the resort to predetermined values for 
statistical lives. The handling of decision-making 
with regards to health and safety in an ad-hoc manner 
may lack a solid theoretical background but it could 
prove to be a better approach for practical purposes.  
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